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TURNING TO A NEW BANK IS A DEFINING MOMENT for both the firm and its current lenders, and 
is hence a strategic decision often taken at the highest level. Consequently, a number of recent 
theoretical models study a firm's decision to switch. Yet, while academics and industry 
observers point to switching costs as a key source of bank rents, there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence on contract conditions just before and after a firm switches to a new bank. 
An analysis of loan conditions is a first—but essential—step in assessing the role that 
switching costs play in credit markets. Our paper makes this first step. 
We analyze the public credit registry of Bolivia between March 1999 and December 2003. 
This novel database allows us to follow firms and banks over an extended period of time, to 
identify switches, and to compare the loan conditions obtained by a switching firm with the 
terms on loans obtained by a large group of similar nonswitching firms. Given the large 
number of loans in the database, we analyze only new loans, thereby ensuring the timeliness 
of the information or loan terms. In order to account for macroeconomic conditions and for 
differences across lenders, borrowers, contracts, and relationship characteristics, we match on 
month of loan origination and on bank, firm, contract, and bank–firm relationship 
characteristics. Using a matching procedure allows us to get closer to answering 
counterfactual questions such as “What loan rate did the inside bank offer to the switcher?” 
and “Is this rate higher than the one offered by the outside bank?” 
The dynamic pattern of bank loan conditions that arises has not previously been 
comprehensively documented. Our findings suggest that a new loan granted by an outside 
bank—one that was not engaged by the firm for at least 1 year and consequently has no recent 
information about the firm—carries a loan rate that is 89 basis points lower than the rates on 
comparable new loans from the firm's current inside banks, and 87 basis points lower than the 
rates on comparable new loans that the outside bank currently extends to its existing 
customers. We also find that when the firm switches, the outside bank is willing to decrease 
loan rates by another 36 basis points within the next year and a half. The combined reduction 
of 122 basis points comprises almost one-tenth of the average observed loan cost of 13.4%. 
However, a year and a half after the switch, the new bank starts hiking up the loan rates—
even if the firm's condition has not deteriorated. Rates increase slowly at first but eventually 
at a clip of more than 30 basis points per year. The switcher is thus “back to square one” (i.e., 
the loan rate charged by the new bank equals what the switcher obtained from its inside 
bank(s) before switching) after some 3 to 4 years. Not surprisingly, the firm will eventually 
start looking for more favorable conditions elsewhere. Sooner or later—presumably when it 
receives a better offer—the firm may again switch banks. 
We also observe that firms having weaker relationships with their inside banks (i.e., firms 
with short or multiple relationships) obtain smaller discounts when they switch. Their loan 
rate cycle is also less pronounced: they receive fewer additional cuts and the rates on their 
subsequent loans increase at a slower pace. Firms in more concentrated regional banking 
markets also obtain smaller discounts and experience a shallower loan rate cycle. 
Information-sharing through the credit registry helps banks distinguish performing from 
nonperforming applicants, consistent with theoretical work by Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and 
Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000), for example. However, banks still suffer from adverse 
selection, given that the credit history available to prospective lenders is limited to the 2 
months prior to an information request. As a result, some nonperformers make payments for 2 
months and manage to switch, but return to nonperformance soon thereafter. 
Overall, our findings corroborate key predictions in theoretical models on bank–firm 
relationships and information-sharing between banks. We document that switching involves 
lower loan rates that subsequently increase. This pattern is possibly due to informational lock-
in, as in Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (2004). Over time, banks privately 
ascertain the firm's quality (by observing its repayment behavior or through the provision of 
other banking products) and start to charge rates that are higher than the firm's quality 
warrants. Information asymmetries between new and existing lenders and additional 
switching costs make such rents possible and prevent firms from instantaneously switching to 
new lenders. Finding that the loan rate cycle is more pronounced for firms where the hold-up 
potential is higher provides further support to our interpretation that the uncovered loan rate 
cycle is due to hold-up problems in bank–firm relationships. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the testable hypotheses and 
underlying assumptions of banking theory on hold-up problems, and then summarizes the 
extant empirical literature and shows how our unique data set allows us to improve the test 
design. Section II describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section III tests our 
hypotheses and provides robustness checks. Section IV concludes. Additional robustness tests 
as well as evidence consistent with the assumptions underlying hold-up models are provided 
in an Internet Appendix (available on the Journal of Finance website at 
http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp). 
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A. Hold-Up Models: Hypotheses and Assumptions 
A bank's ability to privately and recurrently observe proprietary information about its 
customer during a relationship can be beneficial to the customer, but it can also impose 
certain costs. A credit relationship can foster flexibility in writing loan contracts (Boot and 
Thakor (1994), von Thadden (1995)) and can increase access to capital at a lower cost and/or 
with less collateral. In addition, banks may smooth interest rates and reschedule capital 
payments to help their customers overcome financial difficulties (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1994)). A relationship with a reputable institution may also facilitate current and future 
funding from both shareholders and alternative outside sources (Diamond (1991)). Finally, the 
confidentiality of a relationship may facilitate screening and monitoring (Campbell (1979)) 
and prevent the leakage of proprietary information to product market competitors 
(Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Yosha (1995)). 
Access to private information about a borrower could also lead to hold-up problems, however, 
and to the extraction of informational rents. In Sharpe (1990), the incumbent bank has the 
ability to extract rents from its best customers by “holding up” customers from receiving 
competitive financing elsewhere.1 The incumbent “inside” bank gains this monopoly power 
through its informational advantage over the other “outside” banks. If a high quality or 
“good” borrower tries to switch to a new, uninformed bank, it gets pooled with low quality or 
“bad” firms and is offered a higher loan rate. 
In an amended version of the Sharpe (1990) model, von Thadden (2004) shows that outside 
banks limit the inside bank's rent extraction by offering competitively lower rates using 
“optimal randomization” to borrowers that are—at least for them—observationally identical. 
The equilibrium in von Thadden's (2004) two-period model leads to four testable hypotheses: 
• (H1)  
Each period firms may switch banks (i.e., they obtain new loans from new outside banks 
instead of one of their existing inside lenders). 
• (H2)  
Firms that switch receive a loan rate offer from an outside bank that is lower than the offer 
received from their inside bank.2 
• (H3)  
Over time, the outside bank becomes an insider and extracts rents from good firms. 
• (H4)  
Because of adverse selection, a higher proportion of switching firms is worse in terms of 
unobservable risk characteristics than if the firms had been randomly drawn from the 
population. 
In sum, inside banks charge good borrowers loan rates that are higher than warranted by their 
true quality (were it publicly known). The more severe the informational asymmetries (e.g., 
the stronger the bank–firm relationship), the higher the informational rents. 
Note that banking models that incorporate hold-up are founded on two key assumptions: 
• (A1)  
Relationships mitigate informational asymmetries between firms and banks. 
• (A2)  
Relationships create informational asymmetries between inside and outside banks that are 
alleviated by observable firm information. 
B. Empirical Findings in the Literature 
A number of recent papers explore the impact of relationship, firm, bank, and market 
characteristics on the probability of a firm staying with or switching from/to a bank and the 
impact of relationship duration on loan rates and other contract terms (Boot (2000), Berger 
and Udell (2002), and Degryse and Ongena (2008) review this literature). 
Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos (2002), and Gopalan, Udell, and Yerramilli 
(2007), for example, study why firms switch to new banks. Ongena and Smith (2001) and 
Farinha and Santos (2002) find that the likelihood that a firm replaces a relationship increases 
in duration. The number of bank relationships that the firm maintains also negatively 
influences the length of a relationship. These studies also find that, ceteris paribus, young, 
small, high growth, intangible, constrained, or highly leveraged firms switch banks faster. 
An important limitation of these studies is the use of annual (or even lower frequency) data. 
As a result, these investigations cannot focus on what happens right before and after a switch, 
or they have difficulties in distinguishing switching from nonswitching loans, since data sets 
are not comprehensive (e.g., loans from an existing borrower could be classified as switching 
loans because prior or existing loans from a bank cannot be observed). This study, in contrast, 
has access to monthly, comprehensive credit register data that allow us to distinguish between 
switching and nonswitching loans and to analyze how loan conditions and bank–firm 
behavior are affected around the time of switching. 
An extensive set of papers studies the impact of relationship duration on loan rates. The 
evidence in these papers is mixed. In their seminal paper, Berger and Udell (1995) find that 
loan rates decrease in relationship time, which is evidence against hold-up. In contrast, 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), among others, find that loan rates do not change in relationship 
time, which may or may not be consistent with hold-up.3Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), 
Pozzolo (2004), and Degryse and Ongena (2005), on the other hand, find that loan rates 
increase in relationship time, consistent with the hold-up hypothesis. 
These studies run reduced-form regressions on a cross-section of firms. Over time, however, 
the composition of the pool of borrowers may change, as banks get to know their customers 
better and favor certain types. Controls in cross-sectional studies may fail to capture these 
dynamic effects. Hence, differences in loan rates (or other loan conditions) over relationship 
time might be biased due to changes in the quality of the pool of borrowers—which could 
explain the mixed findings in the literature. Moreover, as our results indicate, differences in 
the average relationship duration and hold-up potential across borrower pools and market 
conditions may further complicate any comparison and interpretation. 
The paper closest to ours is Schenone (2010). Using a panel data set, Schenone (2009) studies 
the relationship between loan rates and the intensity of a lending relationship before and after 
a firm's Initial Public Offering (IPO)—an information-releasing event that should reduce 
information asymmetries between inside and outside lenders, thereby reducing the scope for 
hold-up. She finds that prior to an IPO, a firm will pay a lower rate if the lead lender in a 
syndicate did not participate in any of the firm's prior loans, but that loan rates eventually 
increase with the proportion of the loans granted by the lead lender, consistent with hold-up. 
After the IPO, however, no evidence of hold-up is found, as loan rates decrease monotonically 
with the proportion of loans granted by the lead lender. 
Like Schenone (2009), we also use a panel data set—but instead of focusing the analysis 
around an information event, we follow firms and banks over an extended period of time, 
identify switches, and study the loan conditions associated with switching by comparing the 
loan conditions on switching loans to the conditions on similar nonswitching loans. To 
identify similar loans, we match on the month of loan origination and on bank, firm, contract, 
and relationship characteristics.4 To examine whether hold-up eventually arises, we follow 
switchers of unchanged quality and study how conditions on subsequent loans from the new 
bank develop.5 
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Our analysis utilizes data from the Bolivian public credit registry, Central de Información de 
Riesgos Crediticios (CIRC), which is managed by the Superintendent of Banks and Financial 
Entities (SBEF). The SBEF requires all formal (licensed and regulated) financial institutions 
to record information on their loans. As a result, this unique database—one of the most 
comprehensive in the world (Miller (2003))—contains detailed loan contract information, on 
a monthly basis, on all outstanding loans granted by all licensed financial institutions in 
Bolivia.6 For each loan, we have information on the date of origination, maturity date, contract 
terms, and ex post performance. For each borrowing firm, we have information on their 
industry, physical location, legal structure, total bank debt, banking relationships, credit 
rating, and past repayment history. The registry data, however, cannot be matched with firm 
balance-sheet data, for example, since for confidentiality purposes the SBEF altered the 
borrower identities before providing us the data. 
The SBEF requires that some of the information in the credit registry be shared among the 
participating institutions in order to alleviate the otherwise pervasive information asymmetries 
in the Bolivian credit markets. After written authorization from a prospective customer, a 
bank can access the registry and obtain a credit report. The report includes information on all 
outstanding loans of the customer for the previous 2 months. Entries include originating bank, 
loan amount, loan type, value of collateral, value of overdue payments, and the firm's credit 
rating from the originating bank. When banks originate new loans they rate each borrower's 
repayment capacity on a scale from one to five. Ratings equal to one indicate that borrowers 
are expected to repay their debt in full, while ratings greater than one indicate possible 
repayment difficulties. After origination, a loan can be downgraded if the borrower's 
repayment capacity deteriorates. 
Because the available information is limited to the previous 2 months, information 
asymmetries remain.7 For example, if a firm pays back an overdue loan, the record resets 
without any trace of overdue payments on the credit history (Campion (2001)). As we show in 
the Internet Appendix, controlling for other observable characteristics, overdue payments on 
past loans—even when repayment is eventually made—is a predictor of future repayment 
problems. Hence, this information (were it made available) could help banks better evaluate 
new customers. 
Apart from the information shared through the registry and the information gathered through a 
relationship, banks have few other sources of information for their credit evaluations. Most 
firms do not have audited financial statements—or any statements at all.8 As a result, the 
capital markets are not well developed and the banking sector is the principal source of capital 
for most firms (Sirtaine, Skamnelos, and Frank (2004)). Since credit derivatives are not 
widely available, firms seeking to adjust interest payments have to renegotiate or switch. 
Our analysis focuses on commercial loans to firms, in particular, on new loan initiations by all 
commercial banks between March 1999 and December 2003.9 All loans are granted by one 
lender (i.e., are never syndicated). Analyzing only new loans allows us to employ up-to-date 
and comparable firm and contract information at the precise time that firms “switch” to a new 
bank. Motivated by models exploring how switching affects the conditions of standard debt 
contracts, we focus on the initiations of installment and single-payment loans, which comprise 
94% (66%) of the total dollar value (number) of loan initiations in our sample and for which 
the likelihood of repayment is mostly firm-specific and not transaction-specific (as is the case 
with discount documents). Finally, more than 96% of these contracts are denominated in 
US$.10 
The largest bank operating in Bolivia is Banco Santa Cruz, with around 1.4 billion US$ in 
assets, which represents around 20% of total bank assets in the beginning of the sample 
period. Five other banks each have assets of more than 0.5 billion US$. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) measuring concentration in outstanding bank debt equals 1,335 in the 
beginning of our sample period and never exceeds 1,587, which suggests moderate market 
concentration. The HHI for new loans starts at 1,427 and never surpasses 2,334. There is, 
however, substantial regional variation. In the small regions outside the three large regions 
(La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, which account for more than 90% of loan initiations), 
the HHI varies between 3,000 and 7,000, indicating a high degree of market concentration. 
During the sample period there were 33,084 loan initiations of installment and single-payment 
loans to 2,805 firms (of which 59% are corporations and 37% are partnerships or sole 
proprietorships). The corporations in our sample are much larger than the partnerships or sole 
proprietorships. At sample entry, the average (median) corporation has $600,000 ($80,000) in 
bank debt outstanding, while the average (median) partnership or sole proprietorship has only 
$290,000 ($50,000).11 Nearly 25% of the firms in our sample are in the retail trade industry, 
18% are manufacturing firms, and 11% are real estate firms. The manufacturing firms are the 
largest firms in our sample. Overall, these characteristics are very similar to those reported in 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) using the U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). 
Only 20% of our sample firms have multiple relationships, and there is a positive correlation 
between firm size and the number of relationships. The median firm with multiple 
relationships is in the top 15% of bank debt outstanding. This pattern is consistent with 
findings from other countries.12 Finally, the incidence of collateral in our sample is only 24%, 
which is substantially lower than in other samples from more developed economies. For 
example, in the SSBF sample used by Berger and Udell (1995), the incidence of collateral is 
53%. Difficulties in seizing and liquidating pledged assets due to judicial inefficiencies and 
weak creditor rights, for example, could explain the low incidence of collateral in our 
sample.13 
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We now test the four model hypotheses. We first document that switching occurs (H1), then 
analyze the loan rates at which firms switch (H2), investigate how loan rates develop over 
relationship time (H3), and finally investigate adverse selection by comparing the loan 
repayment performance of switchers and nonswitchers both before and after the switch (H4). 
A. Switching 
A.1. Definitions 
We define a new loan as a switch (or a switching loan) when a firm obtains a new loan from 
a bank with which it did not have a lending relationship during the prior 12 months. We call 
such banks outside banks. In effect, we conservatively assume that key inside information 
can get stale as quickly as within 1 year. We call inside banks those banks with a lending 
relationship with the firm during the prior 12 months. We label any new loan that the inside 
bank grants to its existing customers as a nonswitching loan. Figure 1 illustrates our 
definitions. Next, we discuss some key features of our definitions. 
 Figure 1. Switchers, inside banks, and outside banks. The figure depicts the definition of 
switchers, inside banks, and outside banks. We call firm A the switcher and bank 3 the 
outside bank for firm A, as bank 3 lent to firms X, Y, and Z but not to firm A during the last 
12 months. Banks 1 and 2 are the switcher's inside banks, as in the last 12 months firm A had 
at least one loan outstanding with these banks. 
Download figure to PowerPoint 
Our choice of 12 months is motivated by empirical findings suggesting that a substantial 
portion of the bank's inside information is collected during the first year (Cole (1998)). In the 
Internet Appendix, we show that our main results are robust to using 24- and 36-month cut-
offs. A lending relationship encompasses any form of used or unused credit (including credit 
cards, credit lines, overdrafts, and discount documents). As we aim to compare the loan 
conditions from the outside bank with those of the inside bank, we do not retain or analyze the 
few firms that did not obtain any bank credit during the previous 12 months. 
Our definition of switching does not differentiate between those firms that “move” between 
banks and those firms that “add” a bank relationship.14 We believe that investigating the 
conditions under which a firm obtains a loan from another bank (and not from an existing 
lender) is the most pertinent question—and it is the one addressed in von Thadden (2004). 
Differentiating between “adders” and “movers” based on whether they have or do not have 
other outstanding loans at the time of the switch does not necessarily provide a meaningful 
distinction. Adders could be classified as movers if, at the time of the switch, their inside 
loans expired and were not renewed until after they got a loan from an outside bank. 
Similarly, movers could be classified as adders if their inside loans happened to expire a few 
months after the switch. It is therefore hard to develop a meaningful classification without 
relying on future (but possibly endogenous) information. That is, firms may decide to reverse 
their initial decisions, depending on future offers they receive from both the inside and outside 
banks. 
A.2. Statistics 
Given our definition of switching, the data set yields 1,062 switching loans granted to 615 
firms, among the 33,084 loan initiations of installment and single-payment loans (H1). This 
implies that 3% of the loan originations are switching loans, and that 22% of the 2,805 firms 
in our sample switch banks at some point during our 5-year sample period (i.e., 4.5% per 
year). These percentages are comparable to those in Farinha and Santos (2002), for example, 
who document that 64% of the 1,577 Portuguese newly created firms in their sample similarly 
switch during the 16-year sample period they study (i.e., 4% per year; see Degryse, Kim, and 
Ongena (2009) for a general overview of the evidence on relationship duration). 
With regard to the switchers, 77% are corporations and 20% are partnerships or sole 
proprietorships, suggesting that corporations are more prone (or able) to switch. However, 
even after conditioning on legal structure, switchers are larger than the other firms in our 
sample. The average (median) corporation that switches has $1,087,090 ($153,000) in bank 
debt—almost double the amount of nonswitching corporations. Similarly, switching 
partnerships or sole proprietorships have $753,227 ($150,000) in bank debt—almost triple the 
amount of nonswitching partnerships and sole proprietorships. On the other hand, the 
distribution of switchers across industries is very similar to the overall sample: 27% of the 
switchers are in retail trade, 21% in manufacturing, and 11% in real estate. Approximately 
64% of the switchers have a single bank lending relationship, as opposed to 79% for the 
overall sample, consistent with the hypothesis that switchers are larger firms. In fact, firms 
that switched more than once during the sample period are even larger. Among the 615 firms, 
64% switched only once, 20% switched twice, and 16% switched more than two times. 
Table I provides descriptive statistics for switching and nonswitching loans. Although the 
loan rates on switching loans are 28 basis points lower than rates on nonswitching loans, there 
are other differences between the two groups that could explain the lower rates. For example, 
switching loans are more likely (than nonswitching loans) to have shorter maturities, to be 
collateralized, to have installments instead of a single payment at maturity, and to be given to 
firms with better ratings. These differences suggest that outside banks, being aware of their 
informational disadvantage, might try to reduce this disadvantage by adjusting the various 
contract terms and the types of firms to which they are willing to lend. Hence, controlling for 
loan and firm characteristics is essential in estimating the loan rate at which firms are willing 
to switch. The matching procedure we follow is geared to meet this challenge. 
Table I.  Selected Characteristics of Switching Loans and Nonswitching 
Loans  
  
Switching Loans (n = 1,062) Nonswitching Loans (n = 32,022) 
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
Media
n 
Table I.  Selected Characteristics of Switching Loans and Nonswitching 
Loans  
  
Switching Loans (n = 1,062) Nonswitching Loans (n = 32,022) 
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
Media
n 
1. a 
We report the mean, standard deviation, and median for selected loan 
and firm characteristics. The unit of observation in this table is the 
number (n) of loan initiations for switching and nonswitching loans, 
respectively. The summary statistics for Proportion of Loan 
Collateralized are calculated for the subsample of loans that are 
collateralized. We assess the differences in means using the Student's 
t-test. We assess the differences in medians using the Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney test for continuous variables and the Pearson's Chi-square test 
for categorical variables. We indicate whether the differences between 
the corresponding mean and median values are significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels using *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Loan rate (in 
basis points) 1,328*** 396 1,370*** 1,356 301 1,400 
Installment 
loans (in%) 56.03*** 49.66 100*** 46.74 49.89 0 
Loans 
denominated 
in US$ (in%) 
96.23*** 19.05 100* 98.02 13.94 100 
Credit rating 1.04*** 0.27 1*** 1.17 0.51 1 
Sole 
proprietorshi
ps (in%) 
4.90*** 21.59 0*** 12.83 33.44 0 
Partnerships 
(in%) 11.68*** 32.13 0** 14.35 35.06 0 
Corporations 
(in%) 80.60*** 39.56 100*** 70.75 45.49 100 
Table I.  Selected Characteristics of Switching Loans and Nonswitching 
Loans  
  
Switching Loans (n = 1,062) Nonswitching Loans (n = 32,022) 
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
Media
n 
Collateralize
d loans 
(in%) 
40.67*** 49.14 0 23.27 42.25 0 
Proportion 
of loan 
collateralize
d (in%) 
193.11 251.89 123.52 611.75 6,929.79 129.91 
Loan 
maturity (in 
months) 
11.20*** 17.67 5.98*** 18.20 25.84 5.90 
Loan amount 
(in US$) 
331,329*
** 
825,60
0 
80,000**
* 155,670 
439,58
6 41,000 
Floating loan 
rate (in%) 7.81*** 26.85 0*** 5.34 22.4 0 
Total bank 
debt (in 
US$) 
1,918,439 123,038 434,302 
1,983,91
8 21,703 
472,43
3 
Multiple 
bank 
relationships 
(in%) 
82.39*** 38.11 100*** 54.00 49.84 100 
Primary 
lender (in%) 40.30*** 49.07 0***   72.75 44.52 
Scope of 
bank 
relationship 
(in%) 
3.11*** 17.36 0   27.60 44.70 
B. Loan Rates for Switchers 
B.1. Matching 
We now examine whether the loan rate that the switcher receives from the outside bank is 
lower than the rate its inside bank offered (H2). Since the inside bank's unsuccessful offer is 
unobservable, we approximate it using similar loans that the inside bank granted in the same 
month to other comparable firms (Figure 2). Recognizing the possible impact of bank 
characteristics on the inside and outside offers, in a similar matching exercise we also 
compare the rates on the switching loans to the rates of similar loans that the switcher's 
outside bank granted in the same month to other comparable existing customers (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. Switching versus nonswitching loans at the switcher's inside bank. The figure 
displays the analysis in Tables III (Column I) and V, where we compare the rate and other 
conditions of the switching loan with comparable new loans from the switcher's inside banks 
at the time of the switch. 
Download figure to PowerPoint 
 
Figure 3. Switching versus nonswitching loans at the switcher's outside bank. The figure 
displays the analysis in Table III (Column II), where we compare the rate of the switching 
loan with the rate of comparable nonswitching loans that the switcher's outside bank 
originates at the time of the switch. 
Download figure to PowerPoint 
Table II provides a description of the variables we match on.15 Apart from matching on the 
month of loan origination and the identity of the switcher's inside or outside bank, we also 
match on currency denomination and loan type—as well as publicly observable firm 
characteristics such as credit rating, region, industry, and legal structure. We also match on 
other contract terms such as the degree of collateralization, maturity, amount, and loan rate 
proviso (i.e., floating or fixed rate) in order to make the two groups of loans as comparable as 
possible. 
Table II.  Matching Variables  
Category Matching Variables # Possible Values 
1. a 
We report the number of possible values (#) and a range (or list) of 
values for the matching variables. 
Macro Year: month 58 1999:03 – 2003:12. 
Bank Inside bank  2 
= 1 if the firm had a lending relationship 
with the bank in the last 12 months, and = 
0 otherwise. 
Bank Outside bank  2 
= 1 if the firm did not have a lending 
relationship with the bank in the last 12 
months, and = 0 otherwise. 
Loan Currency denomination  2 = 1 if Bolivian pesos, = 0 if US dollars. 
Loan Loan type  2 = 1 if single-payment loan, = 0 if installment loan. 
Firm Credit rating  5 No problems (=1), potential problems, unsatisfactory, doubtful, write-off (=5). 
Loan Region 13 
Chuquisaca, La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, 
Potosi, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, 
USA, Argentina, Paraguay, Panama. 
Firm Industry 18 
Agriculture and cattle farming; Forestry 
and fishery; Extraction of oil and gas; 
Minerals; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, 
and water; Construction; Wholesale and 
retail trade; Hotels and restaurants; 
Transport, storage, and communications; 
Table II.  Matching Variables  
Category Matching Variables # Possible Values 
Financial intermediation; Real estate 
activities; Public administration, defense, 
and compulsory social security; 
Education; Communal and personal social 
services; Activities of households as 
employees of domestic personnel; 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations 
and bodies; Other activities. 
Firm Legal structure  4 
Sole proprietorships; Partnerships (i.e., all 
or some partners have unlimited liability); 
Corporations (i.e., all partners have 
limited liability); Other (includes public 
companies, municipalities, social, 
cultural, sport, and religious associations). 
Loan 
Proportion of 
loan 
collateralized 
 2 
= 1 if the matched loans have similar 
ratios of collateral value to loan size, and 
= 0 otherwise. Collateral value is the 
estimated market value of the 
collateralized assets at the time of the loan 
origination. To define similar ratios we 
use a window of (−30%, +30%). 
Loan Loan maturity  2 
= 1 if the matched loans have similar 
maturity (using a (−30%, +30%) 
window), and = 0 otherwise. 
Loan Loan amount  2 
= 1 if the matched loans have similar 
contract amount (using a (−30%, +30%) 
window), and = 0 otherwise. 
Loan Floating loan rate  2 
= 1 if the interest rate on the loan varies 
more than 50% of the time, and = 0 
otherwise. 
Firm Prior credit rating from   
= 1 if the matched nonswitchers have the 
same rating as the switchers’ most recent 
Table II.  Matching Variables  
Category Matching Variables # Possible Values 
inside banks inside rating that existed prior to the 
switch (when there are multiple ratings 
we use the worse rating), and = 0 
otherwise. 
Loan 
Loan rate on 
prior inside 
loans 
  
= 1 if the matched inside loans have 
similar loan rates (using a (−30%, +30%) 
window) as the switcher's most recent 
inside loan prior to the switch (if there are 
multiple loans, we use the loan with the 
highest loan rate), and = 0 otherwise. 
Firm Total bank debt (in US$)  2 
= 1 if the firms of the matched loans have 
similar total bank debt (using a (−30%, 
+30%) window), and = 0 otherwise. 
Relation Relationship length 58 
The length of a bank–firm relationship in 
months. 
Firm Multiple bank relationships  2 
= 1 if the firm has outstanding loans with 
more than one bank, and = 0 otherwise. 
Relation Primary lender  2 
= 1 if the value of loans from a bank is at 
least 50% of the firm's loans, and = 0 
otherwise. 
Relation 
Scope of the 
bank 
relationship 
 2 
= 1 if the firm has additional products 
(i.e., credit card used or not used, 
overdraft used or not used, and discount 
documents) with a bank, and = 0 
otherwise. 
If banks observe more about the borrowers than we do, and choose contract terms on the basis 
of these unobservable-to-us characteristics, then matching on the above contract terms should 
also reduce unobserved borrower heterogeneity. Unobserved borrower heterogeneity works 
against finding evidence consistent with H2. In von Thadden (2004), unobservable bad 
borrowers are more likely to switch. Hence, if our matching variables do not adequately 
capture borrower quality, then bad switchers are more likely to be paired with good (instead 
of bad) nonswitchers, resulting in smaller estimated cuts (see simulations of the von Thadden 
model in the Internet Appendix). To further reduce any possible unobserved borrower 
heterogeneity, and to control for possible rating biases, in the sensitivity analysis we also 
match using the switcher's most recent inside rating or loan rate prior to the switch.16 Notice 
that matching on both the month of loan origination and loan maturity also allows us to 
control for unobservable economic conditions that could affect the loan rates. 
Overall, our testing strategy has three steps: (i) we match each switching loan with all similar 
new nonswitching loans to other comparable firms granted by the switcher's inside or outside 
banks at the time of the switch; (ii) we calculate the spreads between the rates on the 
switching loans and each matched loan, rSwitch– rNot-switch, and (iii) we regress the spreads on a 
constant (i.e., we estimate rSwitch– rNot-switch =α+ζ, where α is the constant term and ζ is the error 
term). A negative and statistically significant constant term suggests that the rates on 
switching loans are on average lower than the rates on comparable nonswitching loans, which 
we interpret as evidence consistent with H2 and estimates of switching costs.17 
B.2. Switching Loans Matched with Loans from Inside or 
Outside Banks 
B.2.1. Main ResultsTable III presents the matching variables, the number of observations, 
the coefficient on the constant in this regression, robust standard errors, and the resulting 
significance level (at which the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero can be 
rejected). 
Table III.  Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching Loans and 
Matched Loans Given by Inside or Outside Banks  
Matching 
Variables I II III IV V 
1. a 
We assess the spread between the interest rate on a switching loan and 
the interest rates on new loans obtained (by other firms) from the 
switchers’ set of inside banks in Column I and from the switcher's 
outside bank in Columns II to V. We match on the indicated variables. 
All variables are defined in Table II. The variables in Column V refer 
to the strength of the switchers’ relationships with the inside banks 
prior to the switch. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the 
coefficient on the constant. We weight each observation by one over 
the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching loan. 
Table III.  Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching Loans and 
Matched Loans Given by Inside or Outside Banks  
Matching 
Variables I II III IV V 
We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors 
between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean 
interest rate on the switching loans and the mean interest rate on the 
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, two-tailed. 
Year: 
month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Set of 
inside 
banks 
Yes         
Bank   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currency 
denominati
on 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Credit 
rating Yes Yes       
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic 
activity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legal 
structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion 
of loan 
collateralize
d 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table III.  Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching Loans and 
Matched Loans Given by Inside or Outside Banks  
Matching 
Variables I II III IV V 
maturity 
Loan 
amount Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Floating 
loan rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior credit 
rating from 
inside 
banks 
    Yes     
Loan rate 
on prior 
inside loans 
      Yes   
Prior 
relationship 
length 
        Yes 
Prior 
multiple 
bank 
relationship
s 
        Yes 
Prior 
primary 
lender 
        Yes 
Prior scope 
of the bank 
relationship 
        Yes 
Number of 
switching 
loans 
304 276 233 82 45 
Table III.  Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching Loans and 
Matched Loans Given by Inside or Outside Banks  
Matching 
Variables I II III IV V 
Number of 
nonswitchin
g loans 
967 609 487 131 64 
Number of 
observation
s (matched 
pairs) 
1,178 820 659 159 95 
Spread in 
basis points 
with 
matching 
−89.0 −86.9 −96.8 −82.2 −97.2 
 
  (19.2)**
* 
 
  (17.5)**
* 
 
  (19.7)**
* 
 
  (25.0)**
* 
 
  (44.3)*
* 
Spread in 
basis points 
without 
matching 
−76.5 −24.1 −35.9 −56.7 19.83 
 
  (19.9)**
* 
  (27.4)   (32.1)   (62.8) (81.10) 
We start by comparing the switching loan to comparable nonswitching loans from the 
switcher's inside banks. Figure 2 depicts our comparison. Matching on the first 12 variables 
listed in Column I of Table III, we are left with 304 switching loans that are in 1,178 matched 
pairs with 967 nonswitching loans. Every switching loan is therefore matched with on average 
3.9 “comparable” nonswitching loans, that is every switching loan is repeated on average 3.9 
times. To account for this multiplicity, we cluster the standard errors at the switching firm 
level and adjust the point estimates by weighting each observation by one over the total 
number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching loan.18 
The coefficient on the constant in the regression indicates that loan rates on the switching 
loans are 89 basis points below the rates on comparable new loans from the inside banks. To 
separate the effect of matching from the effect of changes in the sample (due to changes in the 
matching criteria in subsequent specifications), we also calculate in each column the 
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching loans and the mean interest rate on 
the nonswitching loans. This “unmatched” difference equals −77 basis points, and is 12 basis 
points larger than the “matched” spread of −89 basis points. Hence, as mentioned earlier, 
ignoring heterogeneity (in this case, by not matching at all) works against finding evidence 
consistent with H2.19 
A drop of 89 basis points in the loan rate is not trivial: the average loan rate during the sample 
period is 13.56% (or 1,356 basis points), with a standard deviation of 305 basis points, and the 
average bank spread (i.e., the difference between ex ante loan rates and deposit rates) is 966 
basis points, with a standard deviation of 145 basis points. Overall, our findings in Column I 
suggest that switchers can obtain a substantially lower loan rate at their new bank than at any 
of their current inside lenders, consistent with H2. 
Next, instead of matching using the loans of the inside banks, we match using the loans of the 
outside banks to their existing customers. Figure 3 depicts our comparison. Since the 
comparison is now within the same bank during the same month, the loan rate differences 
between switching and nonswitching loans cannot be attributed simply to differences in the 
marginal cost of funds between inside and outside banks (or more generally to any form of 
unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the two banks). This is an important advantage over 
the matching exercise in Column I or an alternative exercise whereby some bank 
characteristics are added to the set of matching variables. We therefore consider Column II as 
our benchmark model. The estimated spread is equal to −87 basis points, which is very 
similar to Column I.20 However, ignoring matching in this case leads to a substantially larger 
bias in the estimated spreads.21 
Overall, the results in Columns I and II suggest that the outside banks are not different from 
the switcher's current inside banks in their pricing behavior vis-à-vis their existing customers. 
These findings also suggest that switching might give a firm an initial advantage that fades 
over time—as other comparable customers of the outside banks have to pay more (i.e., if the 
rate cut were permanent, we would have found no systematic differences in the loan rates 
between similar new and existing customers). In other words, our findings suggest that after 
winning the firm with an attractive offer, the outside bank starts behaving like an inside bank, 
extracting rents from good firms, consistent with H3. To test this hypothesis more directly, we 
investigate the dynamic path of loan rates (in Section IV.C) by tracing switchers of unchanged 
quality over time in their new bank. But first we subject our benchmark model to additional 
robustness exercises and explore alternative explanations for hold-up. 
B.2.2. Robustness Analysis We start by replacing the credit rating that the switchers obtain 
from their new bank with the most recent rating they obtained from their inside bank prior to 
the switch. The inside bank's ratings might be more informative, since the inside bank may 
know the firm better. Results presented in the Internet Appendix suggest that ratings become 
better predictors of ex post performance as the length of a relationship increases, consistent 
with A1.22 Moreover, matching on the inside bank's rating (i.e., requiring the comparable 
matched firms to have the same inside rating as the switcher) could help better approximate 
the inside bank's unobserved offer to the switcher. Matching on the inside bank's ratings in 
Column III leaves 659 observations and results in an average spread of −97 basis points. 
In Column IV we also replace the inside bank's most recent credit rating with the most recent 
loan rate. Matching on loan rates instead of ratings has some potential advantages. Ratings are 
observable by other banks through the credit registry, and affect banks’ loan loss provisioning 
(i.e., banks have to provision more for loans with worse ratings). If banks are concerned about 
free-riding behavior by other banks or the costs of assigning low ratings, then credit ratings 
might be less informative than loan rates (which are not directly observable by other banks 
and do not determine loan loss provisioning). Matching on the loan rate yields a spread of −82 
basis points (although the number of observations and loans drops to 159 and 82, 
respectively).23 
Matching on the loan rate should also control for the effect of the strength of switchers’ 
relationships with their inside banks (i.e., switchers with strong relationships with their inside 
banks are more exposed to hold-up and thus receive worse inside offers). Nevertheless, in 
Column V, we also match directly on the strength of switchers’ relationships with their inside 
banks prior to the switch (i.e., we require that the strength of switchers’ relationships with 
their inside banks prior to the switch be similar to the relationship strength of the matched 
nonswitchers). 
To capture relationship strength we use four indicators: Prior Relationship Length (= 
average length of prior relationships), Prior Multiple Bank Relationships (= 1 if prior to the 
switch the firm has outstanding loans with more than one lender, and = 0 otherwise), Prior 
Primary Lender (= 1 if prior to the switch at least one of the firm's inside banks is a Primary 
Lender, and = 0 otherwise), and Scope of Prior Bank Relationships (= 1 if prior to the switch 
the firm has additional products from at least one inside bank, and = 0 otherwise). Matching 
on these four characteristics reduces the number of observations to 95, but leaves the spread 
similar to previous estimates at −97 basis points, which suggests that other variables were 
already sufficiently capturing the effect of relationship strength on the inside banks’ 
unobserved offers. 
B.2.3. Hold-Up and Alternative Explanations If the estimated loan rate discounts can be 
attributed to hold-up problems (as hypothesized above), then we should also observe that 
firms with stronger relationships with their inside banks prior to the switch (i.e., firms with 
greater hold-up potential) obtain greater discounts when they switch. Hence, to examine this 
hypothesis, we reestimate our model in Column V after adding each of our four measures of 
relationship strength as an explanatory variable (i.e., we estimate rSwitch − rNot− switch=α+β*X +ζ, 
where α and β are the coefficients to be estimated, X is a measure of the strength of the 
switchers’ relationships with their inside banks prior to the switch, and ζ is the error term). 
Intuitively, this is similar to splitting the sample into two groups of switchers: those with 
strong relationships with their inside banks and those with weak relationships. 
The estimated parameters when X is equal to Prior Relationship Length are 
 and . Hence, our estimates suggest that hold-up intensifies 
in relationship length, and that only switchers with prior relationships longer than 5.6 months 
obtain a discount when they switch. When X is equal to Prior Multiple Relationships, we 
find that  and , suggesting that multiple relationships 
soften or even eliminate hold-up problems. Additional products with the inside banks seem to 
exacerbate hold-up, although the estimated coefficients for Scope of the Bank Relationship 
are not statistically significant:  and .24 Overall, we 
view these additional cross-sectional results as an important step toward a more decisive 
identification in favor of the hold-up hypothesis. 
Next, we investigate the role of market concentration. We set X equal to the HHI of 
outstanding loans at the regional level, a measure of banking market concentration prior to 
switching, and find that  and . Hence, if market 
concentration measures the intensity of competition, this result confirms predictions in von 
Thadden (2004). When competition is less intense, outside banks bid less aggressively for 
new customers, and thus switching loans carry smaller interest rate discounts. 
Nevertheless, the Internet Appendix also investigates a number of alternative (that is, non-
hold-up) explanations for our findings. For example, a general downward drift in interest rates 
(which occurs during part of the sample period) combined with loan rate stickiness at the 
inside bank could motivate firms to switch, which would explain our findings. Banks may 
also try to attract firms through temporary sales campaigns, or bank distress may cause firms 
to flee certain relationships. The Internet Appendix, however, shows that we find no evidence 
consistent with these alternative explanations. 
C. Loan Rates after Switching from the Outside Banks 
C.1. Main Results and Robustness Analysis 
Next, we test H3 by tracing the switchers over time in their new bank, and calculate the 
spread between the loan rate on the switching loan and the loan rate on new loans that the 
switcher obtained from the outside bank after the switch. The comparison is now not only 
within the same bank but also within the same borrower. Apart from matching on bank and 
borrower identity, we also match on all other variables of our benchmark model, which 
include credit rating and other loan conditions. This implies that we compare only the loans to 
switchers that remained with the new bank and whose rating did not change after the switch. 
This matching exercise yields 353 switching loans to 246 firms and 1,430 comparable future 
loans. More than 98% of these loans have the best rating; the rest obtain the second best. 
These are the firms that the outside bank originally rated highly, and that maintained their 
high ratings (suggesting that the bank had not been overconfident about these firms and did 
not have to belatedly recognize their lower true quality once they became better known). In 
effect, these are the “good” firms in von Thadden (2004) that are potentially exposed to hold-
up. 
Using this sample, we group the corresponding matches in 6-month periods (“1 to 6 months” 
to “At least 37 months”) after the switch and regress the spreads adjusted by the interbank 
market rate on a constant, the 6-month period dummies, and 53 calendar-time dummies 
(allowing the spreads to depend on the level of the market rates or other conditions that might 
vary over calendar time). We report the coefficients of the 6-month period dummies. As 
before, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level. 
The estimated spreads appearing in Table IV, Panel A indicate that in the first 18 months after 
the switch, the loan rate drops further by up to 36 basis points, and starts increasing only 
afterward. After a firm switches, the “old” inside bank may update its probability of losing 
this firm and become more aggressive in pricing, offering lower loan rates. Hence, the outside 
bank may have to give additional discounts to keep the new customer.25 Once past this initial 
period in which the old bank is still an insider and the new bank an outsider,26 the firm starts 
paying higher interest rates. Three years after the switch, the loan rate on new loans is 190 
basis points higher than the loan rate on the switching loan, consistent with H3. 
Table IV.  Spreads before and after Switching  
Panel A: Spreads between Interest Rates on New Loans by the Outside 
Bank and the Switching Loan 
  
Periods (in 
months) 
since the 
switching 
loan 
1 to 6 7 to 12 
13 to 
18 
19 to 
24 
25 to 
30 
31 to 
36 
At least 
37 
Number of 
switching 
loans 
260 165 112 72 43 29 29 
Table IV.  Spreads before and after Switching  
Panel A: Spreads between Interest Rates on New Loans by the Outside 
Bank and the Switching Loan 
  
Periods (in 
months) 
since the 
switching 
loan 
1 to 6 7 to 12 
13 to 
18 
19 to 
24 
25 to 
30 
31 to 
36 
At least 
37 
Number of 
future loans 455 324 219 167 95 66 104 
Number of 
observation
s 
587 378 267 198 114 84 131 
Spread in 
basis points 
−2.0**
* 
−21.9
* 
−36.2*
* 31.4 28.2 60.4* 
190.6**
* 
(0.0)  (12.6) (15.9) (21.7) 
(21.6
) 
(36.0
) (50.5) 
Panel B: Spreads between Interest Rates on Past Loans by the Inside 
Bank and the First Loan by the Inside Bank 
1. a 
In Panel A, we calculate the spread between the interest rates on new 
loans obtained by the switching borrower from the outside bank and the 
interest rate on the switching loan. In Panel B, we calculate the spread 
between the interest rates on past loans obtained by the switching 
borrower from the inside bank and the interest rate on the first loan 
obtained from the inside bank. Apart from matching on bank and 
borrower identity, we also match on the relevant variables from our 
benchmark model in Column II of Table III (i.e., currency 
denomination, loan type, credit rating, region, economic activity, legal 
structure, collateralization, maturity, amount, and loan rate proviso). 
The variables are defined in Table II. We group the corresponding 
matches in seven half-year periods (“1 to 6” to “At least 37” months) 
Panel B: Spreads between Interest Rates on Past Loans by the Inside 
Bank and the First Loan by the Inside Bank 
since the switching loan and regress the spreads adjusted by the 
interbank market rate on a constant, the seven half-year period 
dummies, and calendar-time dummies. We report the coefficients of the 
half-year period dummies. We cluster at the firm level and report 
robust standard errors between parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed. 
Periods 
(in 
months) 
since the 
first 
recorded 
loan 
1 to 
6 7 to 12 13 to 18 
19 to 
24 
25 to 
30 
31 to 
36 
At 
least 
37 
  
Number 
of first 
recorded 
loans 
372 181 90 67 32 21 6 
Number 
of future 
loans 
1,115 559 310 205 99 41 11 
Number 
of 
observatio
ns 
2,992 1,498 644 581 220 118 37 
Spread in 
basis 
points 
−4.9 −47.2*** 
−103.8*
** 
−67.0
* 
96.1**
* 
120.8*
** 
128.6*
* 
  (4.
9) (15.1) (16.3) 
 (40.
0) (20.2) (45.5) (59.6) 
As a robustness check, rather than looking forward, we look backward and investigate 
whether a loan rate cycle (similar to the one identified among the outside banks) can also be 
traced in the loans that switchers obtained from their inside banks before the switch. We thus 
identify all of the loans that a switcher obtained from its inside bank and compare the loan 
rate on the first recorded loan from a given bank with all subsequent loans from that bank 
using the same specifications as in the forward exercise. Table IV, Panel B reports the 
estimated coefficients of the group dummies. The resulting loan rate pattern is similar to the 
one identified in Panel A, despite the fact that we are compelled to mix relationships of 
various lengths. Early on, the loan rate drops; it then levels off, and subsequently increases, as 
in Panel A. 
Figure 4 displays the resulting loan rate pattern. The figure contains the coefficient estimates 
from Tables III and IV, within their one-standard error bands. The act of switching involves a 
rate reduction of 87 basis points (estimates from Column II of Table III). As the matched 
estimates in Table IV are anchored to this decrease, the estimates suggest that the rate 
differential returns back to zero more than 3 years after the switch. The estimated median 
length of an observed relationship is almost 5 years. Hence, a year and a half after the median 
firm starts paying “hold-up rents,” it switches again to another bank. Banks recoup the initial 
discounts by charging higher loan rates later on. Our estimates suggest that 5 years after the 
switch banks break even.27 The dynamic pattern we identify and the distinct firm and bank 
break-even periods pose an interesting question for future theoretical work. 
 
Figure 4. Spread before and after switching. The figure displays the spread (in basis points) 
between the interest rate on new loans obtained by the switcher and interest rates on loans 
obtained by matched firms from inside or outside banks before, around, and after the switch. 
The solid lines are the coefficient estimates from Tables III (Column II) and IV, while the 
dashed lines indicate minus and plus one standard error around the coefficient estimate. The 
estimates of Table IV (Panel A) are anchored at the −87 spread from Table III (Column II). 
The estimates of Table IV (Panel B) are anchored at zero. The horizontal arrowed line 
indicates the estimated median length of relationships in the sample. 
Download figure to PowerPoint 
All in all, our matching exercises suggest that good firms eventually pay a substantially higher 
loan rate the longer they borrow from the same bank, in line with the informational lock-in 
present in von Thadden (2004). The consistency of the results before and after a switch gives 
further credence to the presence of a distinct loan rate cycle in the data and provides a 
possible explanation for the mixed findings in the existing empirical literature. 
C.2. Hold-Up and Alternative Explanations 
To advance us further toward decisive identification of hold-up, we also explore the effect of 
a number of key variables on the loan rate dynamics. For example, the extent to which the 
outside banks are able to extract rents from their new customers should depend on the strength 
of their relationship with those customers. For example, the hold-up potential should be lower 
for switchers that maintain active lending relationships with their “old” inside banks. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we estimate rSwitch– rNot-switch=α+β*X + γ1*T + γ2*T2 +δ1*X*T 
+δ2*X*T2 +ζ, where α, β, γ1, γ2, δ1, and δ2 are the coefficients to be estimated, X is a measure 
of relationship strength or the degree of local market concentration, T is the time in months 
since the switch, and ζ is the error term. We find that when X is equal to Multiple Bank 
Relationships, the estimated coefficients suggest that maintaining multiple relationships 
softens (but does not eliminate) hold-up ( , , , and 
, with  and ). When X is equal to Scope of the 
Bank Relationship or Primary Lender, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms do 
have the expected signs, but they are not statistically significant. 
To investigate the role of market concentration on the loan rate cycle, we also set X equal to 
HHI and find that the cycle is less pronounced in more concentrated markets ( , 
, , and ). If market concentration measures competition, 
then these results suggest that in more competitive markets banks bid more aggressively to 
attract new customers and recoup these discounts from the subset of borrowers they hold up 
later on. Banks seeking to attract new customers in less competitive markets do not need to be 
as aggressive, and rates subsequently do not increase as much. Note, however, that the level 
of interest rates in such markets could still be higher. 
Finally, we also investigate a possible alternative explanation for our findings in Table IV. 
Specifically, if better firms tend to borrow again sooner or more frequently than worse firms, 
then the dynamic pattern of interest rates that we observe in Table IV could be due to changes 
in firm quality, which is not captured by the variables we match on. Limiting the sample to 
firms that borrow again within 6 (12) months after the switch leaves us with 76% (89%) of the 
sample firms (which is not surprising given that the median loan maturity is only 6 months), 
but results are virtually unaffected (see the Internet Appendix). 
C.3. Other Loan Conditions 
We also investigate the change in three other loan characteristics around and after switching. 
We match on all previously employed variables now including Loan Rate. The results are 
reported in Panel A, Table V (we repeat the results of our benchmark model for the loan rate 
in Column I). We find that switching loans are more collateralized, have longer maturities, 
and are larger in size (loan amounts continue to increase until 1 year after the switch). While 
the maturity on future outside loans decreases again more than 3 years after the switch (Panel 
B), the other two loan characteristics do not change in a statistically significant way. 
Table V.  Differences in Loan Conditions on Switching Loans and 
Matched Loans Given by Inside Banks  
  I II III IV 
Matching Variables Loan Rate 
Proportion of 
Loan 
Collateralized 
Loan 
Maturity 
Loan 
Amount 
  
Panel A: The Difference in Loan Condition on a Switching Loan and 
New Loans Obtained (by Other Firms) from the Switchers’ Set of inside 
Banks 
Year: month, bank, 
currency 
denomination, loan 
type, floating loan 
rate, credit rating, 
region, economic 
activity, legal structure 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan rate   Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion of loan 
collateralized Yes   Yes Yes 
Loan maturity Yes Yes   Yes 
Loan amount Yes Yes Yes   
Value-weighted by 
borrower/inside bank 
loans 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table V.  Differences in Loan Conditions on Switching Loans and 
Matched Loans Given by Inside Banks  
  I II III IV 
Matching Variables Loan Rate 
Proportion of 
Loan 
Collateralized 
Loan 
Maturity 
Loan 
Amount 
  
Panel A: The Difference in Loan Condition on a Switching Loan and 
New Loans Obtained (by Other Firms) from the Switchers’ Set of inside 
Banks 
Number of switching 
loans 276 285 325 317 
Number of 
nonswitching loans 609 631 750 758 
Number of 
observations (matched 
pairs) 
820 845 1,069 1,091 
Difference in loan 
conditions (at time of 
the switching loan) 
−86.9*** 26.86** 6.43*** 86,164 
(17.5) (11.50) (1.37) (79,837) 
Panel B: Difference in Loan Condition on New Loans Obtained by the 
Switching Borrower from the Outside Bank and the Switching Loan 
1. a 
In Panel A, we assess the difference in each loan condition on a 
switching loan and the loan condition on new loans obtained (by other 
firms) from the switchers’ set of inside banks. We match on the 
indicated variables (similar to the benchmark model in Column II of 
Table III). The variables are defined in Table II. We regress the 
difference in each loan condition on a constant and report the 
coefficient on the constant. We cluster at the switching-firm level and 
report robust standard errors between parentheses. The results for the 
loan rate are also in Table III, Column II. In Panel B, we calculate the 
Panel B: Difference in Loan Condition on New Loans Obtained by the 
Switching Borrower from the Outside Bank and the Switching Loan 
difference in each loan condition on new loans obtained by the 
switching borrower from the outside bank and the loan condition on 
the switching loan. We match on the indicated variables (similar to the 
benchmark model in Column II of Table III). We group the 
corresponding matches in 6-month periods (“1 to 6 ” to “At least 37” 
months) since the switching loan and regress the spreads adjusted by 
the interbank market rate on a constant, the group dummies, and 53 
calendar-time dummies. We report the coefficients of the group 
dummies. We cluster at the firm level but do not report the robust 
standard errors. The results for the loan rate are also in Table IV, Panel 
A. *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
two-tailed. 
1 to 6 months since 
the switching loan −2.0 −0.00 −2.56 −18,870 
7 to 12 −21.9* 3.58 3.65 116,652** 
13 to 18 −36.2** −1.20 2.23 158,689 
19 to 24 31.4 21.67 4.39 380,635 
25 to 30 28.2 −8.37 3.75 293,430 
31 to 36 60.4* −36.08 −5.78 348,297 
At least 37 190.6*** −15.13 −9.05** 900,641 
Overall, with the exception of collateral our findings suggest that switching initially involves 
better loan conditions, but that afterward conditions seem to tighten up again. One possible 
reason switching loans are more likely to be collateralized is because collateral is used by 
outside banks to mitigate ex ante information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
(see Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Chan and Thakor (1987), for example). 
Nevertheless, information asymmetries will persist if the borrowers’“collateralizable” wealth 
restricts the design of loan contracts as selection mechanisms (Bester (1987)). 
D. Adverse Selection: Loan Repayment and 
Information Sharing 
Our final hypothesis, H4, posits that (because of adverse selection) a larger proportion of 
switching firms is worse in terms of unobservable risk characteristics than a random draw of 
the population. To investigate this hypothesis, Figure 5 compares the repayment history of 
switchers and nonswitchers. After first comparing the entire population of switching and 
nonswitching firms, we then compare a subsample of matched firms. 
 
Figure 5. Information sharing and number of switchers with nonperforming loans. The 
figure displays the number of switchers (top row) and nonswitchers (bottom row) with 
nonperforming and performing loans for the various time periods indicated with vertical 
arrows and labeled at the bottom. The black boxes provide ratios of conditional performance. 
Using a standard Pearson Chi-square test, equality of the proportions between the various 
groups of switchers and nonswitchers can be rejected at the 1% level of significance for all 
groups without matching. 
Download figure to PowerPoint 
Comparing the entire population of switching and nonswitching firms, we find that switchers 
are on average better performers. In the 2 months prior to the switch, only 8% of the 615 
switchers do not perform (i.e., have overdue payments on one of their outstanding loans). In 
contrast, 26% of the 2,422 nonswitchers do not perform during the same period, suggesting 
that outside banks (compared to inside banks) are less willing to extend credit to borrowers 
with observable repayment problems. If past nonperformance is predictive of future 
nonperformance, these results also suggest that the information-sharing that takes place 
through the registry helps outside banks select mostly good firms. 
However, a look at the percentage of firms that improved just prior to the 2-month common 
information window reveals an interesting pattern. We find that 54% of the switchers with 
nonperformance in the [−4,−3] period become performing during the critical [−2,−1] period. 
In sharp contrast, the corresponding figure for nonswitchers is only 14%. This pattern 
suggests that firms use this common information window strategically (i.e., since the outside 
banks are reluctant to extend credit to firms with observable repayment problems, firms with 
problems in [−4,−3] that want to switch make their due payments just prior to the [−2,−1] 
period). 
While these substantial differences in the conditional repayment figures are consistent with 
H4 (i.e., compared to nonswitchers, a larger proportion of switchers has unobservable 
repayment problems), these differences may also be due to other observable differences 
between the two groups. Hence, we reproduce our analysis for a subsample of matched 
switching and nonswitching firms using our benchmark model (i.e., we match on bank, 
month, firm, and loan characteristics as in Column II of Table III). Although the two groups 
are now much more similar, we still find that 75% of the switching firms with repayment 
problems in [−4,−3] become performing during the critical [−2,−1] period, while the 
corresponding figure for nonswitchers is only 46%, still consistent with H4.28 
Overall, these results suggest that the information-sharing regime assures that mostly 
performing firms can switch, a result that is in line with general theoretical priors such as 
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000). Nevertheless, some 
nonperformers adversely mix with performers by making a good appearance during the 2-
month information period, suggesting that some information asymmetries remain. Additional 
results provided in the paper and in the Internet Appendix further support this hypothesis 
(e.g., information rents are larger for firms with stronger relationships with their banks, and 
ratings become better predictors of ex post loan performance as the length of the bank–firm 
relationship increases). 
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Using the Bolivian credit registry between 1999 and 2003, we study the loan conditions and 
bank–firm behavior right before and after a firm switches to a new bank. 
We find that turning to a new bank leads to a substantial drop in the loan rate: 87 basis points 
at switching time followed by an additional 36 basis points on new loans obtained within the 
next year and a half. However, after this period, the “new” (now inside) bank starts increasing 
its loan rate—even if the firm's financial condition has not deteriorated. After around 3 years 
the switching firm is back to where it started (i.e., the loan rate charged by the new bank now 
equals what the switcher obtained from its inside banks before switching). Other loan 
conditions follow a similar economically relevant pattern. Consequently, the firm will 
eventually (when its observable financial performance allows) start looking for more 
favorable conditions at other banks. We also find that firms with short or multiple 
relationships and firms in more concentrated regional banking markets obtain smaller 
discounts when they switch and have a shallower loan rate cycle. 
The information-sharing regime in place allows the outside banks to select mostly performing 
firms. However, since the information available in the credit register covers only the past 2 
months, the outside banks still suffer from adverse selection: some “bad” firms make their due 
payments for 2 months and manage to switch, but return to nonperformance soon thereafter. 
The better loan conditions a firm obtains upon switching, the subsequent tightening of 
conditions (possibly due to informational lock-in), and the presence of adverse selection due 
to limited information-sharing corroborate key elements in modern banking theory (Sharpe 
(1990), Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (2004), for example). More empirical research is 
warranted to investigate more deeply the effects of key institutional characteristics on the 
documented loan rate patterns and bank–firm behavior in credit markets. 
Footnotes 
• 1 
Hold-up costs are also present in Rajan (1992), since in his model the bank has the 
power to withdraw financing when it perceives the firm to be inadequately managed. 
This degree of control can be costly because it reduces the incentives of the firm 
manager to exert effort. In Hauswald and Marquez (2003, 2006), the informational 
advantage is differentiated across banks. See also Egli, Ongena, and Smith (2006), 
Black (2008), and Karapetyan and Stacescu (2008). 
• 2 
von Thadden (2004) assumes that firms switch when the offer is strictly lower. 
However, his model also demonstrates that offers that are strictly lower will most 
likely occur. See Black (2008) for an incisive discussion. 
• 3 
If lending costs decrease in relationship length, their evidence would suggest that 
banks extract rents, which would be consistent with the hold-up hypothesis. Rates 
remain constant also in Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Harhoff and Körting (1998), and 
D’Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz (1999). 
• 4 
Most studies assume that the collateral and maturity decisions are taken either 
independently or sequentially after the loan-granting decision but before the 
determination of the loan rate. Ignoring the joint character of the loan decision may 
bias the findings (Berger et al. (2005), Brick and Palia (2007), and Ortiz-Molina and 
Penas (2008)). By matching on collateral and loan maturity, we do not need to assume 
anything about the decision process. Most studies also ignore loan fees (Hao (2003)) 
and the pricing implications of cross-selling (Liberti (2004)). By matching on bank, 
time, type of loan, relationship, and loan characteristics, we control for loan fees and 
cross-selling (assuming banks at the same point in time apply the same fees and cross-
selling practices to similar loans and borrowers with similar relationship 
characteristics). Matching is nonparametric and does not incorporate information from 
outside the overlap region between the treatment and control groups. 
• 5 
Some recent papers also compare the rates on loans from a firm's inside or outside 
bank. Results in these studies are also mixed. Using an Italian survey, Barone, Felici, 
and Pagnini (2006) find that rates are between 25 and 123 basis points lower after a 
switch. On the other hand, analyzing the U.S. Survey of Small Business Finance, 
Black (2006) finds that interest rates on outside loans are on average 40 basis points 
higher than loans from existing banks. However, none of these studies analyze the 
development of loan conditions around switching by matching new loan initiations on 
multiple bank, loan, and firm characteristics. 
• 6 
Other databases employed in studies by Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos 
(2002), and Gopalan, Udell, and Yerramilli (2007), for example, lack crucial loan 
contract information (such as the loan rate), report only at a quarterly or yearly 
frequency, and/or cover only part of all corporate borrowing (both across firms and 
credit products). 
• 7 
Limiting “the amount of data made available for distribution to the financial 
institutions to the current month” is common in many countries (see Miller (2003), 
Table 1A.7, Column 3). Administrative costs and regulatory objectives may explain 
the short information-sharing window. A 2-month window seems too short to achieve 
optimal memory loss à la Vercammen (1995). 
• 8 
Bolivia's corporate sector is segmented. It is composed of a few formal firms and a 
multitude of very small firms, most of which are single-person businesses that remain 
informal. The formal firms have access to commercial bank credit, while the very 
small firms can borrow only from informal institutions (e.g., microfinance NGOs and 
foundations), which do not report to the CIRC. This was the situation until April 2000, 
as the Bolivian law prohibited the creation of private credit bureaus (Campion (2001)). 
Following the change in the law, other private bureaus specializing in micro and 
consumer credit were created, but were not operational as of December 8, 2003 (de 
Janvry et al. (2003)). 
• 9 
To keep the set of financial institutions homogeneous in terms of financial structure 
and regulation, we focus on loans from commercial banks and exclude loans from 
other formal nonbank institutions (such as private financial funds, credit unions, 
mutual societies, and general deposit warehouses). Since the late 1980s, all 
commercial banks are privately owned. Banks are also prohibited from owning 
nonfinancial firms (Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006)). We start the sample period in 
March 1999 because prior to this date we cannot distinguish between commercial and 
consumer loans. The sample period is characterized by an economic slowdown. The 
average growth rate of real GDP is 2.2.%, substantially lower than the average 4.5% 
growth rate of the previous 5 years. 
• 10 
More than 90% of all deposits and credits in Bolivia are denominated in US$. Because 
the economy is highly dollarized, the exchange rate policy follows a crawling peg with 
the US$. During the sample period the Bolivian peso was depreciating with respect to 
the US$ at a constant, predetermined rate. We translate the loan amounts in Bolivian 
pesos and report all loan amounts in US$. 
• 11 
As information on total firm assets is not available, we approximate firm size with 
total bank debt. Using data from the SSBF for the United States, Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) find that, conditional on the existence of institutional debt, the ratio of bank 
debt to total debt does not vary significantly with firm size. For firms with less than 
$15,000 in total assets, this ratio is equal to 51%, while for firms with more than 
$2,000,000 in total assets the ratio equals 62%. Since capital markets are less 
developed in Bolivia than in the United States, this ratio may vary even less, such that 
total bank debt is most likely highly correlated with firm size. 
• 12 
See Petersen and Rajan (1994) for the United States, Harhoff and Körting (1998) for 
Germany, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) for Belgium, Ongena and Smith (2001) 
for Norway, and Farinha and Santos (2002) for Portugal. 
• 13 
Although the incidence of collateral is low, the proportion of the loan that is 
collateralized (i.e., the value of collateral to the loan amount) appears quite large. 
Collateral values are on average six times larger than the loan amounts, and 70% of 
the loans that are collateralized have collateral values larger than the loan amount. The 
collateral values that are recorded in the registry indicate the estimated market value of 
the collateralized assets at the time of the loan origination. Typically, such values are 
higher than the amounts banks are able to recover in the event of bankruptcy. Hence, 
even fully collateralized loans could still carry a positive loss in the event of default—
a prerequisite for von Thadden (2004) to be applicable. Nevertheless, in a sensitivity 
analysis we also investigate the robustness of our findings in the subsample of loans 
without collateral. 
• 14 
Moving versus adding a relationship may differ for newly created firms (Farinha and 
Santos (2002)) or for firms that switch following bank mergers (Degryse, 
Masschelein, and Mitchell (2009)). As we analyze only firms that had an inside bank, 
de novo firms are unlikely to play an important role in our sample. No bank mergers 
took place during or immediately prior to the sample period, but we investigate the 
robustness of our results to the exclusion of firms that were borrowing from three 
banks that failed just prior to or during the sample period (as some of those banks’ 
assets were transferred to other banks). As discussed later, we find no changes in our 
results. 
• 15 
Given the number of observations available, we rely on matching rather than on a 
propensity score (as in Dehejia and Wahba (2002), for example). The score 
methodology is often criticized because the same score may be given to items with 
very different characteristics. 
• 16 
As discussed later, rating biases may exist because of information asymmetries 
between inside and outside banks, the observability of ratings to other banks through 
the credit registry, and loan loss provisioning. 
• 17 
If switching costs contain a transactional component that varies across borrowers (as 
in Bouckaert and Degryse (2006)), then our estimates would provide only a lower 
bound on total switching costs, since borrowers with higher costs would not switch. 
• 18 
In the Internet Appendix, we subject this specification to a series of robustness checks. 
We first reestimate the model as follows: using fewer matching variables, without 
weighting the observations, dropping firms that got an inside loan in the same month 
of the switch (since these firms might be switching for other reasons), using only loans 
without collateral, and using one observation per switching loan. The latter is possible 
if instead of using each matched pair, we calculate the spread using the difference 
between each switching loan and the median interest rate of its matched loans. In all 
cases, results are very similar. We also reestimate the model after matching 
consecutively on the total amount of outstanding debt as a proxy for firm size, 
relationship characteristics with the new bank using Multiple Relationships, Primary 
Bank, and Scope of the Bank Relationship as defined in Table II, and borrower 
identity. The number of observations declines gradually to only 40 observations, but 
the estimated spreads remain very similar—although not always statistically 
significant. 
• 19 
The change in the sample of the switching loans (as a result of changes in the 
matching variables) affects the difference between matched and unmatched spreads. 
Adding matching variables reduces the set of loans that qualify and has the salutary 
effect of dropping loans with rarer characteristics for which a match cannot be found. 
It is a priori not clear if these smaller subsamples are less heterogeneous, as there may 
be a few common loan types that are very different from each other. However, 
heterogeneity will eventually dissipate, bringing the wedge between the matched and 
unmatched spreads down to zero (consider the limiting case of a single pair). 
• 20 
We also subjected this model to the same series of robustness checks as the model 
presented in Column I. The results are in all cases very similar and are presented in the 
Internet Appendix. 
• 21 
This finding suggests that borrower heterogeneity is higher when we match using 
loans from the outside banks. Although in von Thadden (2004) the outside banks do 
not have existing customers, outside banks in reality may aim to diversify by attracting 
switchers that are different from their existing customers. 
• 22 
Additional results presented in the Internet Appendix suggest that the outside banks do 
not seem to bother to rate their new customers (i.e., they give the best rating to almost 
all of their new customers) and, consistent with A2, rely on the inside banks’ 
observable ratings for their pricing. Evaluating new customers should be very 
expensive, as very little information is known outside a bank–firm relationship or the 
credit registry. If outside banks recognize their informational disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the inside banks, then assigning the top rating while using the inside banks’ more 
conservative ratings for pricing might be very attractive—as it also reduces loan loss 
provisioning. 
• 23 
In the case of multiple inside ratings or loan rates (in Columns III and IV), we used the 
worst rating or the highest loan rate. Results are robust to using the average or the best 
rating/loan rate (see the Internet Appendix). The same holds for the counterparts of the 
model presented in Column I of Table III (see the Internet Appendix). 
• 24 
We do not estimate the model using Prior Primary Lender as an independent 
variable, since it is equal to one for 99% of the observations in this matched sample. 
• 25 
Though not explicitly modeled, additional rate cuts may be consistent with the general 
model intuition in von Thadden (2004). 
• 26 
The length of this period during which the bank may be collecting additional inside 
information seems similar to the 1-year period documented in Cole (1998). 
• 27 
The average yearly switching rate for active loan-initiating firms equals 13.6% (for all 
firms it is 10.6%). Assuming constant duration dependence, the resulting median 
duration is 5 (6) years. If duration dependence is positive (Ongena and Smith (2001)), 
then the estimated median duration will be shorter. Integrating the estimated loan rate 
spread over time (i.e., multiplying the estimated loan rate spread times the length of 
the period for which it is estimated) puts the break-even point at 63 months. 
• 28 
In the Internet Appendix, we also show that both observable and unobservable past 
repayment problems are predictive of repayment problems in future loans. 
Unobservable repayment problems remain predictive of future nonperformance—even 
if we control for observable repayment problems—which suggests that this adverse 
unobservable information about the firm could help outside banks better select and 
price loans for their customers. 
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